Now, our further lectures about the very fateful year of 1938 are going to cover a number of issues, among them the further evolution of Germany's policy in Asia, a subject that is not been adequately discussed. But, of course we need to discuss the tremendous crisis over Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia, it must be understood, was not critical to Hitler's policies. His idea of a union with Austria was a central obsession of his life. The need to reach a military understanding with Poland for an invasion of the of the Soviet Union was also an absolutely essential military reality. Czechoslovakia wasn't. And much to the frustration of the German nationalists in Czechoslovakia, Hitler had really not paid very much attention to them. This policy was corrected, or reversed, or however you want to describe it, by Ribbentrop. And there became much more agitation in Czechoslovakia for the Czechs, excuse me, for the Germans in Czechoslovakia to achieve the goal that they sought in 1919, which was to leave Czechoslovakia and join Germany.
You must understand that the big debate about Czechoslovakia being some sort of big debate about democracy is rubbish. Czechoslovakia was a mess, and Beneš was a sleazy, ethnic nationalist - a sort of modern-day Milošević. One of the problems in history and historiography in this field is the attempt to put a pretty face on some of Hitler's opponents. And Beneš is certainly a classic case of that. Czechoslovakia was a mess. Not only did the Germans want to leave, the Slovaks wanted to leave and some of the other ethnic groups also wanted to leave Czechoslovakia. The state was a complete disaster from day one. So that's an important point to understand.
Secondly, the allies in 1919 and 1918 had promised self-determination, a promise that they would not keep in terms of their own policies relating to the Germans outside of Germany. So, there was really zero moral case for preventing the Germans in Czechoslovakia from seeking union with Germany. None whatsoever. In fact, there's a strong moral case in favor of that.
In May 1938, a great crisis developed. Whether it was by accident, or a deliberate lie by Beneš, who was a pathological liar, Czechoslovakia gave England and France the impression that Germany was about to attack them. This was a lie, or an innocent mistake. Whatever it was, it was completely untrue. However, in the chaos and bumbling of foreign policy of the time, Britain and France basically threatened Germany with war if they attacked Czechoslovakia. This absolutely enraged Hitler, and he made the mistake of allowing himself to be provoked by a secondary objective, Czechoslovakia, to divert his attention from his main objective: a military alliance with Poland for the invasion of the Soviet Union, and the continuing efforts to reach a nonaggression pact with England.
It must be understood, however, that you could argue that Czechoslovakia was a potential military threat to Germany. The Czechs repeatedly publicized the fact that they were going to use airfields in Czechoslovakia for French and Russian air attacks on Germany. America nearly went to war with Cuba, and thereby nearly sparked a world war in the Cuban missile crisis, because of the worry about Russian missiles in Cuba.
The Germans could be considered to have similar -though perhaps less serious - concerns about foreign air attacks being launched from Czechoslovakia. So, the point is that there were national security reasons for Germany to want to eliminate a potential threat in Czechoslovakia. After the May crisis in 1938, Hitler gave secret orders that Czechoslovakia was to be, quote, "wiped off the map." He didn't like Beneš, and most people in Europe didn't, and he was tired of Beneš' endless lies, and his endless intrigues, and so on.
Hitler's plan was probably a mistake. It ran the risk of a larger war in Europe, which is precisely what Germany didn't want. However, you, have to keep in mind that this is the Ribbentrop era in German foreign policy. Nobody in England and France who had any sanity was about to plunge Europe into war to bailout a mess like Czechoslovakia. So, they wanted out of the whole situation. However, Ribbentrop's clumsy diplomacy made it very difficult for them to make a face-saving exit. So, this whole situation just escalated, and escalated, and escalated. There's also great myth that Chamberlain quote-unquote "appeased" Hitler. This is not true, simply not true. Chamberlain took a highly confrontational approach towards Germany, in effect, threatening Germany with war are over an issue that really had nothing to do with British foreign policy. So that's also a myth.
Anyway, without going into details, the whole mess headed towards war with Britain and France nearly going to war with Germany over the defense of a mess: Czechoslovakia. At the last minute, Hitler backed off. You must understand that the public statement of Germany, and the real German policy were not the same. Hitler's goal was to simply seize all of Czechoslovakia. That's what he wanted. He never wanted the Munich agreement. If anybody engaged in any appeasement at Munich, it was Hitler, who backed down and accepted an agreement that he hated. Hitler was furious about the Munich agreement, and the Munich agreement laid the groundwork for World War II. It was a nonsensical agreement where Britain and France were basically guaranteeing the indefensible - what was left of Czechoslovakia.
This laid the groundwork for World War II. Even worse, in a truly bizarre statement, Chamberlain, who hadn't gotten any sleep for two days, made the preposterous statement that he had achieved peace in his time. Now, Chamberlain was stupid, but he wasn't that stupid, and he realized the next day he made an appallingly idiotic statement. However, for obvious reasons, it was not really considered prudent to repudiate that statement. So, the statement remained, but we need to also correct a couple myths that Chamberlain thought that he'd achieved global peace, or whatever. He did not. He was stupid, but he wasn't that stupid. However, Munich set a tripwire for war by, in effect, having Britain and France guarantee the indefensible - the the mess of Czechoslovakia.
In March 1938, that mess fell apart. Slovakia tried to exit Czechoslovakia, which they'd been planning to do for quite a while, and which they eventually did do after the Cold War, and Germany pressured the Czechs to allow them to seize control of the rest of the country. This put England in a very, very, very difficult spot, because it basically made Chamberlain look like a total fool, and that set the stage for very negative developments to come, which we will discuss in a further lecture.